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Abstract 
 
During the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, the United Kingdom obtained an opt-
out option on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).  When Tony Blair came to power, 
he promised there would be a referendum on the euro if the government decided it was in 
the national interest to join.  Many believed Tony Blair intended to call and try to win a 
referendum on the euro.  Therefore, in the late 1990s, the debate over the euro raged in 
Britain, filling the pages of the tabloids and the minds of many Britons.   
In this paper based on empirical research conducted in London in 2005-06, I 
investigate whether the business sector had a clear preference on the issue of British 
membership in the EMU and tried to influence the government‟s decision.  I use Jeffry 
Frieden‟s model of interest group preferences regarding exchange-rate policies to develop 
hypotheses regarding the position of the business sector on the euro.  Research findings 
reveal that the business sector was divided on the issue of euro membership exactly as 
Frieden‟s model predicts.  However, the intensity of business preferences decreased 
overtime.  By the end of Tony Blair‟s second term, the business sector had become 
neutral on the issue of the euro.   
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I. POLITICAL ECONOMY EXPLANATIONS OF EMU 
 
The level and stability of the exchange rate is an issue of particular concern for 
nation states, as it affects domestic socioeconomic actors within the relations of 
production.  These interest groups will have different monetary policy preferences and 
will likely pressure the government to achieve what they view as the optimum solution.  
Political economist Jeffry Frieden argues that the more open an economy is, the more 
politicized monetary policy choices will be.
1
  Therefore, the European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) should have created divisions in the European Union (EU) 
between coalitions of interests favoring exchange-rate stability and those favoring 
national monetary policy autonomy.  However, studies on the position of business 
regarding EMU are lacking.  As Barry Eichengreen and Jeffry Frieden regret, “serious 
analysis of the distributional consequences of EMU is scarce.” 2   Likewise, Stefan 
Collignon and Daniela Schwarzer note that, even though there is now a large literature on 
EMU, “[f]ew studies […] have looked at the role of the private sector, especially the 
business and banking community.”3   
The reason for this lacuna in the literature on EMU is that political scientists have 
tended to explain the advent of European monetary integration from a realist perspective.  
They have presented the project of monetary union as a solution to contain the power of 
Germany within the EU or as a means to balance against the United States (US) in the 
                                                 
1
 Jeffry Frieden, “Exchange Rate Politics” in Jeffry Frieden & David Lake, eds. International Political 
Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth, 4
th
 ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2000), p. 269. 
2
 Barry Eichengreen and Jeffry Frieden, eds. The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), p.10.  
3
 Stefan Collignon and Daniela Schwarzer, Private Sector Involvement in the euro: The Power of Ideas 
(New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 1. 
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International System (IS).  A main argument developed by Michael Baun, Robert Art, 
and Karl Kaltenthaler is that the reunification of Germany brought to the forefront the 
“German question” again and that EU member states used EMU to ensure the 
commitment of Germany to European integration.
4
  Another argument – also based on 
concerns with relative power and advanced by David Andrews as well as economists 
Martin Feldstein and Charles Wyplosz – is that member states wanted to create a 
monetary system where all would be granted equal weight to replace the European 
Monetary System (EMS) that had become dominated by Germany.
5
  Creating a rival to 
the US dollar and thus a counterbalance to American power is yet another realist 
explanation for EMU proposed by Kenneth Dyson and Kevin Featherstone, David 
Howarth, and George Ross.
6
   
Only a few scholars have studied EMU from the perspective of domestic 
socioeconomic actors and attempted to determine their position and role on the issue of 
monetary integration.  Jeffry Frieden was the first to argue, in 1991, that “Europe‟s 
leading financial and multinational firms have been the stronghold of support for 
                                                 
4
 Michael Baun, “The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics: Germany, France, and European integration,” 
Political Science Quarterly 110(4), 1996, pp. 605-24; Robert Art, “Why Western Europe Needs the United 
States and NATO,” Political Science Quarterly 111(1), 1996, pp. 1-39; and Karl Kaltenthaler, Germany 
and the Politics of Europe’s Money (London: Duke University Press, 1998). 
5
 David Andrews, “Germany, Maastricht and EMU: The Limits of Integration Theory,” Paper 
Presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, 1992; Martin 
Feldstein, “The Political Economy of the European Monetary Union: Political Sources of an Economic 
Liability,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(4), 1997, pp. 23-42; and Charles Wyplosz, “European 
Monetary Union: Why and How it Might Happen,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(4), 1997, pp. 3-
22. 
6
 Kenneth Dyson and Kevin Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and 
Monetary Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); David Howarth, The French Road to European 
Monetary Union (London: Palgrave, 2001); and George Ross, “Monetary Integration and the French 
model” in Andrew Martin & George Ross, eds. Euro and Europeans: European Monetary Integration and 
the European Model of Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 76-102. 
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breaking down remaining barriers to EC financial and monetary integration.”7  Frieden, 
however, only presents a few suggestive patterns.  For example, he cites the fact that 
British membership of the Association for the Monetary Union of Europe (AMUE) 
consisted of eight financial firms and related services, two diversified multinational 
corporations, and two major exporters.
8
   
Andrew Moravcsik also took into consideration the preferences and role of 
domestic socioeconomic actors in his book, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and 
State Power from Messina to Maastricht, where he tested two competing hypotheses to 
account for EMU and other European integration milestones: a geostrategic explanation 
and a political economy one.  He rejected the main geopolitical arguments for EMU and 
found evidence supporting a political economy explanation.  However, the influence of 
economic interests in his case study of EMU was inconclusive for he wrote:  
Although the evidence permits some tentative conclusions, in particular the 
rejection of objective geopolitical factors in motivating the move to EMU, a 
more precise and reliable determination of the relative weights of economic 
interest and European ideology in each country must await the availability of 
more primary sources.  In each country records of the preferences and tactics of 
business groups and the deliberation of national executives remain incomplete. 9  
 
Contrary to Moravcsik who tends to support Frieden, Kathryn McNamara directly 
contradicts the argument that the private sector favored the development of EMU in her 
1998 study of European monetary integration.  She contends that economic actors are not 
able to assess the distributional consequences of different types of monetary regimes.  
She argues that, “microeconomic uncertainty casts doubt on the view that the economic 
                                                 
7
 Jeffry Frieden, “Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global 
Finance,” International Organization 45(4), 1991, p. 441. 
8
 Ibid., p. 448. 
9
 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 428. 
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benefits of monetary cooperation are compelling enough to stimulate strong and highly 
differentiated interest group pressures of the type proposed by Frieden, because the 
groups have trouble formulating and thus acting on a fixed and compelling preference.”10  
She empirically tested Frieden‟s assertion that leading financial and multinational firms 
strongly supported European monetary union by conducting interviews with EU officials 
and business members of the AMUE.  However, she found no evidence to support this 
claim.  For example, she determined that the financial sector was not necessarily in favor 
of EMU but divided.  A single currency would cause some banking activities such as 
hedging and currency trading to suffer from a loss of business.  Many banks, therefore, 
had reservations about monetary union.  She also reports the inability of some 
multinational firms to determine their preferences towards monetary union.  Finally, she 
rejects the main evidence brought forward by Frieden by arguing that membership of the 
AMUE is not an indication of actors‟ preferences, asserting that many bankers joined the 
AMUE to be informed about EMU, not to lobby for it.  British banks, for example, would 
be affected by the creation of a single currency on the continent even if the United 
Kingdom (UK) was not in the euro zone.  They joined precisely for this reason and not 
out of a desire to push for UK membership.  McNamara demonstrates that the AMUE is a 
problematic case study of actors‟ preferences and intentions, as it originated as a political 
organization that sought the support of businesses and not the other way around.  In other 
words, she characterizes the organization as reactive to political decisions rather than 
proactive to trigger change.   
                                                 
10
 Kathryn McNamara, The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 37. 
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Political scientists, who have taken into consideration business interests when 
studying European monetary unification, have not reached a consensus on these interests‟ 
preferences and role in the project.  This scholarly disagreement reflects a problem 
inherent in the field of political science, namely that, “there is still yet unresolved conflict 
whether economic interests determine political actions or whether economic behavior 
adjusts to politically determined situations.”11  
I address the problem exposed by Hefeker with a case study of British business 
and the euro.  I argue that theories of interest group politics regarding exchange-rate 
policy can best be tested with the British case.  As the United Kingdom government 
decided, during the negotiations of the Maastricht treaty, to leave the option to join EMU 
open, the issue was highly debated in the nation.  Expression of preferences and 
positioning of economic actors on the question of monetary integration were more 
prevalent and easier to observe in the UK than in other EU member states.  In addition, 
because the British government has not ruled out membership, pressure on the 
government regarding this question should still be observable.   
By studying the case of the United Kingdom, my research intends to clarify two 
highly debated issues in International Political Economy: (1) whether economic actors 
are able to assess the distributional consequences of monetary integration on their welfare; 
and (2) whether they try to influence economic policy in a way that maximizes their 
interests.   
                                                 
11
 Carsten Hefeker, Interest Groups and Monetary Integration: The Political Economy of Exchange 
Regime Choice (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 31. 
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II. BRITISH ECONOMIC ACTORS AND EMU 
1. Frieden’s Model 
Frieden has provided the most famous model mapping preferences of 
socioeconomic actors towards exchange-rate policy.  In “Invested Interests: The Politics 
of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance,” Frieden reflects on the 
monetary policy choices that states face in a world where capital increasingly flows 
freely.  According to the Mundell-Fleming model, governments cannot achieve 
exchange-rate stability, capital mobility, and monetary policy autonomy 
simultaneously.
12
  Only two of these goals can be met, and one must be sacrificed.  
However, when there is high capital mobility across borders as in today‟s world economy, 
the choice left to states is between exchange-rate stability and monetary policy autonomy.  
Frieden argues that some economic actors would privilege the first goal while others 
would want the state to conserve its independence of decision.  
Frieden‟s model accounts for preferences of economic actors between a fixed 
exchange-rate system and a flexible-exchange rate system.  However, we can apply it to 
the choice a state faces between joining a monetary union or conserving its national 
currency, which will divide economic actors according to the same preference – stability 
of the exchange rate vs. national monetary policy autonomy. 
Frieden contends that export-oriented producers of tradable goods and 
multinational corporations would prefer a fixed exchange rate.  Exchange-rate volatility 
                                                 
12
 For a full explanation of the Mundell-Fleming model, see Benjamin Cohen, “The Triad and the 
Unholy Trinity: Problems of International Monetary Cooperation” in Jeffry Frieden and David Lake, eds. 
International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth, 4
th
 ed. (Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth, 2000), pp. 245-57. 
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involves risks and potential costs for those companies that are dealing with international 
trade and payments. Hedging as a protection against uncertainty still bears a cost and 
internationally exposed companies would prefer having a fixed exchange rate in order not 
to have to worry about currency fluctuations.  Frieden remarks that the stability of the 
exchange rate would be particularly relevant to producers of tradable goods, whose 
competitiveness depends on price and less so for producers whose comparative advantage 
is quality.   In addition, internationally oriented companies value a fixed exchange rate 
over monetary policy autonomy because they are not as sensitive to domestic economic 
conditions since their main markets are abroad.  The state‟s ability to increase or depress 
local demand through national monetary policy is therefore not a crucial concern to them. 
Frieden also identifies two groups that would have opposite preferences and 
would prefer a flexible exchange rate. One group is producers of import-competing 
tradable goods for the domestic market.  These companies are mainly concerned with 
local demand and not adversely affected by exchange-rate volatility.  Frieden notes that 
this group might even benefit from exchange-rate volatility as it makes importing riskier 
and therefore limits foreign competition.  The non-tradable sector (for example services, 
construction, transportation) will also favor a flexible exchange rate, as firms in this 
group are not required to deal in foreign exchange and are very sensitive to domestic 
economic conditions.   
In addition to preferences of socioeconomic actors towards the stability of the 
exchange rate, Frieden includes another dimension in his model: preference regarding the 
level of the exchange rate or the value of the national currency.  Frieden argues that 
tradable producers and non-tradable producers would have opposite preferences 
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regarding the level of the exchange rate, with tradable producers preferring a depreciated 
currency.  As he explained, “From a differential standpoint, the lower (more depreciated) 
the exchange rate, the higher is the price of tradable goods relative to non-tradable 
goods.”13  In addition, a depreciated currency is the optimal choice for export-oriented 
producers of tradable goods, as depreciation makes their products very attractive on 
foreign markets.  For the same reason, import-competing tradable producers will also 
favor a depreciated currency as the price of imports will be higher than the price of goods 
produced locally, raising the attractiveness of domestic products.  On the other hand, 
international investors will prefer an appreciated currency that lowers the price of assets 
they want to acquire abroad. 
 
2. Hypotheses Derived from Frieden’s Model 
I use Frieden‟s model on the preferences of socioeconomic actors towards 
exchange-rate policy to derive hypotheses on the position of British business on the euro.  
A necessary qualifier here is that even though Frieden‟s model is useful to study the 
preferences of economic actors on EMU, it is not a model intended to account for the 
preferences of actors towards monetary union but towards a fixed exchange-rate system.  
A monetary union is different from a fixed exchange-rate system in that upon entry, the 
national currency ceases to exist.  A state cannot change its exchange rate without leaving 
the monetary union and reestablishing its national currency, which would be very costly 
and highly unpractical.
14
  Therefore, in a decision about whether to join a monetary union, 
the choice that economic actors face is reduced to the first dimension of Frieden‟s model: 
                                                 
13
 Frieden, Invested Interests, p. 446 
14
 Peter Kenen, “Common Currencies vs. Currency Areas: Preferences, Domains, and Sustainability,” 
The American Economic Review 87:2, May 1997, p. 211. 
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the elimination of exchange-rate risk with a major trade bloc or the ability of the state to 
keep pursuing an independent monetary policy.  The value of the national currency is not 
a question anymore, although there might be disagreement about the rate of entry.   
From this reasoning, we can safely assume that companies located in the UK that 
export mainly to continental Europe would be strongly in favor of adopting the euro.  For 
producers of tradable goods whose main market is not Europe but other regions, the value 
of the monetary union‟s currency in foreign-exchange markets compared to the value of 
the national currency to be abandoned will be a consideration.  What will matter for these 
producers is whether the single currency to be adopted is a stronger or weaker currency 
than the national currency currently in use.  This outcome will depend on the monetary 
policy pursued by the monetary union‟s central bank compared to that traditionally 
pursued by the national central bank.  As the European Central Bank has maintained an 
interest rate of about two percent compared to the Bank of England‟s commitment to a 
much higher interest rate, the euro has consistently been a weaker currency than the 
pound.  Therefore, both exporters to the euro zone and to other markets should be in 
favor of Britain‟s adoption of the euro. 
Import-competing producers of tradable goods for the domestic market should be 
against EMU even though the pound is appreciated against the single currency because of 
their overriding concern with national monetary policy autonomy.  Actors that benefit 
from an appreciated national currency should be against Britain entering EMU as well.  
Retailers that can import cheap products from the euro zone to be sold on the domestic 
market and non-tradable producers in general that benefit from the differential between 
the prices of tradable and non-tradable goods should be opposed to the single currency.   
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To summarize, hypotheses derived from Frieden‟s model on the preferences of 
economic actors in Britain on the question of euro membership are as follows: 
 The business lobby in favor of British membership of the euro should be 
composed of British exporters to the euro zone and other markets and foreign-
owned multinational corporations established in Britain; 
 The business lobby against the euro should be composed of import-competing 
producers of tradable goods for the UK market, non-tradable producers, and 
retailers. 
III. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Scholars who have attempted to address the preferences of businesses on the 
question of  euro membership have relied on very limited empirical data, usually simply 
derived from the stated preferences of trade associations.
15
   The empirical data used in 
this case study of Britain and the euro is much more comprehensive, as I not only 
surveyed the position and lobbying activity of the leading business associations in Britain 
but also examined the involvement of businesses in the major campaigns for and against 
the euro, and traced actions taken by large foreign-owned multinationals acting in their 
individual capacity.  The position of business interests, at the beginning of the debate on 
the euro in Britain, was exactly as predicted by Frieden‟s model.  There was a strong 
business lobby composed of large export-oriented producers of tradable goods and 
multinational corporations pitted against a lobby group made up of import-competing 
producers of tradable goods, non-tradable producers, and retailers, as will be shown.  
                                                 
15
 For example Moravcsik, 1998; Talani-Simona, 2000; Walsh, 2000; and Duckenfield, 2006 solely 
relied on the position of trade associations in their study of the business position on EMU. 
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However, business preferences on the question of British membership of the euro 
evolved over time and veered towards neutrality.   
 
1. Initial Position of Business Interests on the Euro 
In the United Kingdom, three leading trade associations represent different 
business interests.  The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) represents large 
manufacturers and is dominated by a few influential corporations, the Institute of 
Directors (IoD) acts on behalf of medium-size companies mainly involved in the services 
sector, and the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) is the leading lobby group for small 
businesses and self-employed individuals.  The position of the trade associations on the 
euro was as predicted: The CBI, whose membership includes many tradable goods 
producers exporting to the euro zone, was in favor of Britain adopting the single currency 
and joined the pro-euro campaign.  The FSB, whose members do not trade internationally 
and have little to gain from stability of the exchange rate but much to fear from the 
government‟s loss of independent monetary policy, was strongly opposed to the euro.  
The IoD, representing many businesses involved in the non-tradable sector was also 
opposed to Britain joining the euro. 
As the British government of Tony Blair had promised that there would be a 
referendum on the euro, two campaigns for and against the euro, backed and funded by 
business interests, were launched in Britain in 1998, in preparation for the referendum.  
The pro-euro campaign, Britain in Europe (BiE), was chaired by Lord Colin Marshall, 
Chairman of British Airways and President of the Confederation of British Industry.  
Some of Britain‟s largest businesses contributed significant sums of money to BiE.  For 
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example, the multinational corporation (MNC) Unilever – maker of the internationally 
popular Dove soap and Lipton tea – donated ₤270,000 to Britain in Europe from 1999 to 
2001.
16
  Other companies that supported the organization with generous donations were 
British American Tobacco that supplied ₤25,000 over 2001 and 2002 to help the cause, as 
well as B.A.E. Systems, the British MNC specialized in defense equipment, which 
contributed ₤50,000 in 2002.17  British Petroleum was yet another important contributor 
that helped set up the Scottish branch of BiE.
18
  
Business for Sterling (BfS), a pressure group opposed to British membership of 
the single currency, was also launched in 1998.  It was chaired by Nick Herbert, the 
former director of the British Field Sports Association, a domestic hunters club.  The bulk 
of BfS membership consisted of companies that mainly operate in the domestic market 
and have very little trade with Europe.  For example, prominent members were the 
leading British food retailer Sainsbury that dominates the British supermarket industry; 
Dixons, the UK retailer of electronics; and Hanson, the UK leading supplier of heavy 
building material.  Not surprisingly, BfS also benefited from the support of the 
Federation of Small Businesses and the Institute of Directors, the latter having provided 
help in setting up the organization.
19
 
Finally, foreign-owned multinational corporations issued threats of moving their 
production to continental Europe or not to open new factories in the UK if the 
government did not adopt the euro in the future.  The Japanese MNC Toyota was one of 
                                                 
16
 Unilever plc. Annual Reports, 1999-2001. 
17
 British American Tobacco, Annual Reports, 2001-2002; B.A.E. Systems, Annual Report, 2002. 
18
 Robert Shrimsley, “Pro-euro Campaign Reveals Blue-chip Credentials.” The Financial Times, August 
24, 2000, p. 2. 
19
 Personal interview with Ruth Lea, Former Head of Policy Unit, Institute of Directors, London, 
November 30, 2005. 
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the first companies to pressure the government to adopt the single currency as soon as 
possible.  In January 1997, Toyota started using threats to influence the government that 
was due, by the end of the year, to state its decision on whether the UK would take part in 
the first wave of countries adopting the euro in 1999.
20
  Head of Toyota Hiroshi Okuda 
announced that the company, which exports 75 percent of its production, would consider 
building new plants on the continent if the UK did not join EMU.  In December 1997, 
Toyota decided to build its second European plant in France rather than in Britain.  Many 
observers believed that Toyota took this decision because France was in the euro area 
whereas Britain was not.
21
  In 1999, Nissan also issued threats to move production to the 
continent if the British government did not make a decision to enter the euro zone in the 
near future.
22
  Threats to disinvest started coming not only from the Japanese automotive 
MNCs but also from Peugeot, General Motors, and BMW that warned the UK car 
industry might suffer adverse consequences if a positive decision on the euro was not 
taken.
23
  Soon the MNCs in the motor vehicle industry were joined by multinational 
corporations in other industries urging the government to adopt the single currency.  In 
November 1998, 114 industry leaders representing multinational corporations in various 
fields signed a petition asking the government to join EMU.
 24
  The combined turnover of 
these companies was estimated at £200 billion, a quarter of the wealth generated in the 
                                                 
20
 “Toyota Urges Britain to Join the Euro,” The Times, January 30, 1997.  
21
 “Britain Loses to France in Pounds 400 Million Fight for Car Jobs,” The Times, December 10, 1997. 
22
 “Nissan Urges Early Entry in Euro,” The Times, August 18, 1999. 
23
 “Car Industry Warns of Bleak Future if UK Fails to Join the Euro,” Financial Times, October 26, 
1998. 
24
 “Join Euro, Urge Business Leaders,” The Northern Echo, November 24, 1998. 
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UK. It was the first time a demand to the government to join the single currency was 
backed by so many leading businesses.
25
 
 
Table 1.1: Initial Position of Business Interests on British Euro Membership  (1998-
1999) 
 
 PRO-EURO ANTI-EURO 
Official Positions Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI) 
Membership:  Large export-
oriented companies in the 
manufacturing sector 
Institute of Directors (IoD)  
Membership:  Medium-size 
companies mostly in the 
service sector 
 
Federation of Small 
Businesses (FSB) 
Membership: small firms and 
self-employed individuals 
operating mainly on the 
domestic market 
 
Campaigns 
 
Britain in Europe (BiE) 
Chair: Colin Marshall, 
Chairman of British Airways, 
President of the CBI 
Donors: Unilever, British 
American Tobacco, B.A.E. 
Systems 
 
 
 
 
Business for Sterling (BfS) 
Chair: Nick Herbert, Director 
of British Field Sports Society  
Donors: Sainsbury, Dixons, 
Hansons  
 
 
Direct Lobbying 
(threats) 
Foreign-owned MNCs  N/A 
 
 
 
2. Evolution of Business Preferences on the Euro 
 
                                                 
25
 Ibid.  
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While clear preferences for and against the euro divided the business sector in 
Britain in the late 1990s, by 2003, the division had eroded, and a neutral stance became 
the norm.  The largest trade associations, the CBI and the IoD, which had been 
respectively in favor and against membership of EMU, stopped campaigning on the issue 
and declared neutrality.  The euro campaigns both experienced difficulties.  The most 
interesting story is that of Britain in Europe, which lost its focus after it was revamped 
from a pro-euro campaign to simply a pro-Europe campaign, and slowly lost business 
interest and support.  And finally, the multinational corporations stopped threatening to 
disinvest and even declared that they no longer wanted the government to join the euro.  
The following paragraphs explain this transformation in the business sector from intense 
preferences to neutrality on the euro. 
 
a. Trade Associations  
The two main associations, the Confederation of British Industry and the Institute 
of Directors, had difficulty sustaining an official position on the euro.  The British trade 
associations were very careful in adopting an official position on the euro, taking time to 
consider seriously the question by polling their members.  The policy position taken by 
each association reflected the opinion of the majority of the membership.  However, the 
policy position each association took, respectively for and against the euro, was short 
lived.   
The CBI announced its position on the euro only on July 22, 2007, shortly after 
the elections that brought Tony Blair to power.  In the run up to this announcement, the 
CBI had featured impartial debates in its internal magazine, CBI News, where both views 
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on the issue were exposed by different heads of companies.  The CBI strove to make the 
debate an economic one and never let political arguments infiltrate the pages of its 
magazines and newsletters.  As membership of the CBI was divided and not unanimous 
on the euro.  The official position taken by the association was moderate, with the CBI 
declaring it favored a cautionary “yes,” provided EMU was successful.26  However, the 
media, especially the anti-euro Murdoch press, was quick to portray the CBI as staunchly 
pro-euro.   The CBI came to make the headlines very often and was accused of putting 
the interests of downsizing multinationals first by being unequivocally in favor of a 
policy that divided the nation.  Headlines about the CBI being a controversial, fierce 
supporter of EMU were countless in late 1999.
27
  By 2000, the CBI decided to declare 
neutrality on the issue of British membership of the euro.  
The Institute of Directors had preceded the CBI in taking a stance on the euro. 
The IoD adopted its official position on the euro at its annual convention in April 1996 by 
declaring that the UK should not join in the foreseeable future.
28
  As was the case with 
the CBI, the membership of the IoD was divided on the issue of the euro, with about one-
third supporting membership of the single currency.
29
  The stance taken by the IoD was 
also not sustained overtime.  The IoD eventually declared neutrality on the issue.  The 
turning point for the IoD in its involvement in the euro debate came when the “No 
Campaign,” of which the IoD was an official supporter, released a contentious political 
                                                 
26
 Confederation of British Industry, “A Conditional Yes to EMU,” CBI News, September 1997, p. 3. 
27
 See for example, Mark Atkinson, “CBI to Plump for the Euro,” The Guardian, July 20, 1999, p. 23; 
Robert Lindsay, “CBI Members Back Blair Over Joining Euro,” Birmingham Post, July 21, 1999, p. 17; 
Rik Kendall, “CBI Comes Under Attack for its Pro-Euro Stance,” The Journal, July 29, 1999, p. 29; and 
Olivier Morgan, “CBI Tips Towards Euro as Top Dogs Join Lobby Group,” The Observer, November 28, 
1999, p. 3. 
28
 “IoD Rejects a Single Currency,” The Times, April 25, 1996, p.25; Nick Herbert, “IoD Membership 
Backed Stance over Euro,” Financial Times, January 8, 1999, Letter to the Editor, p. 14. 
29
 Herbert, “IoD Membership Backed Stance over Euro”  
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advertisement to be shown in cinemas across Britain.  The anti-euro ad featured British 
comedian Rik Mayall dressed as Hitler lifting his arm in a Nazi salute and saying, “Ein 
Volk, ein Reich, ein Euro,”  a direct reference to the Nazi slogan, “Ein Volk, ein Reich, 
ein Führer.” 30 The distasteful clip was not well received in the country, as it was deemed 
totally inappropriate and insulting to the memories of the Holocaust victims.  The IoD did 
not want to be associated with a lobby group that had become too radical in its opposition 
to the EU.  Shortly after the advertisement was shown, the IoD asked that its name be 
withdrawn from the list of official supporters of the “No Campaign.”31  Subsequently, the 
association declared neutrality on the euro debate. 
The two main trade associations in Britain with clashing interests took opposite 
stances on the euro and then reverted to neutrality when attacked by the media or when 
acquiring bad publicity by being associated with a radical political argument.  This shows 
that trade associations are particularly concerned with their public image, as they 
represent a multitude of companies.  Pleasing and retaining members is crucial to the life 
of the association.  Therefore, trade associations‟ positions on controversial policy issues 
are likely not to be sustained.  Digby Jones, Director of the CBI, illustrated this reality 
when he explained his decision to declare neutrality on the euro: “You don't have to be a 
rocket scientist to know that the euro is a divisive subject.  I didn't change our policy but 
what I did was to say let us concentrate on the things that unite us."
32
   
 
b. The Pro-Euro Campaign: Britain in Europe  
                                                 
30
 Respectively, “One people, one empire, one euro,” and “One people, one empire, one leader.” 
31
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32
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While the CBI declared neutrality on the euro in 2000, many of its largest 
members kept their desire to see Britain adopt the single currency and continued to be 
involved in the pro-euro campaign that had been set up in 1998, BiE.  The campaign soon 
started to worry the Blair cabinet, as the initiative had been started independently by 
business leaders before the government was certain it needed a coalition to back its 
conditional support for the euro.  Members of BiE, however, strongly believed Tony 
Blair intended to take Britain into the euro and were convinced that he would deliver on 
this issue.  Leaders of BiE, therefore, approached 10 Downing Street to get the Prime 
Minister involved in the campaign.
33
  This was a golden opportunity for the government 
to assume control of the campaign and change its focus.  A new person, chosen by the 
government, was designated to head the coalition: Simon Buckby, who had successfully 
run the 1997 Labour Party advertising campaign.  Buckby‟s mandate was to reconfigure 
the campaign in order to allow the Prime Minister to support it:  “I changed the purposes 
of the campaign and that then allowed Brown and Blair to launch it.”34 
The main condition for the support of the Prime Minister was that BiE reduce its 
emphasis on joining the euro and campaign, instead, on a broader pro-EU stance.
35
  The 
revamped campaign would aim at addressing and deconstructing common anti-Europe 
arguments, such as: the EU is nothing but a costly and inefficient bureaucracy; being tied 
to the EU jeopardizes Britain‟s special relationship with the US: and EU ties threaten 
                                                 
33
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34
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35
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Britain‟s identity.36  The argument made to participants of BiE was that such as focus 
would prepare the ground to campaign later for the euro.  For example, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Gordon Brown had explained to members of BiE that they needed to first 
campaign on the pro-European issue.  Then, at a later date, he assured them, “…we will 
move onto the specifics for the Euro, once my five economic tests have been met.”37  
Richard Laming, member of the European Movement Executive Committee and Public 
Affairs Manager of the British Soft Drink Association, representing exporters to the euro 
zone, explained: “It all hinged on these five tests so what the government told us was that 
once the tests were met, they wanted us to say „let‟s join the euro,‟ but that until they 
were met, we had to be indecisive about the euro.  So we weren‟t allowed to speak up the 
need or the urgency to join the euro.”38  Therefore, by the time of the official launch of 
the BiE campaign, the original pro-euro stance of the organization had been significantly 
toned down.  The aims of BiE changed from, “…campaigning for a Yes vote in a euro 
referendum to campaigning to stay in the EU and keeping open an option to join the 
euro.”39   
The official launch of BiE, in October 1999, gathered important figures in the 
world of politics.  Kenneth Clarke, the former Chancellor of the Exchequer under the 
Conservative government of John Major; Michael Heseltine, former Conservative Deputy 
Prime Minister; and Charles Kennedy, leader of the Liberal Democrats, joined Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown, and Foreign Secretary 
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Robin Cook in backing BiE.  The message was about the benefits of being in the 
European Union in general.  Tony Blair made a speech that started with these 
inspirational words, “Once in each generation, the case for Britain in Europe needs to be 
remade, from first principles.  The time for this generation is now.”40  After making the 
case that being part of the EU is in the British national interest, Blair reiterated the 
ambiguous policy of his government on the euro: “In principle, if the single currency 
succeeds and it is in Britain's economic interest, we should join.  In practice, the 
economic conditions must be met. Meanwhile we prepare so we can decide.”41   
From the time Simon Buckby took over BiE to the general election of 2001, 
businesses understood the position of the government and what the new director of BiE 
was doing and why he was doing it.  Even though the public stance had been changed, 
businesses still believed the aims of the campaign were the same and that the government 
would deliver on the euro.
42
  The message businesses heard from 10 Downing Street was 
simple: The government would not join EMU in this Parliament, but would most 
probably join in a second term.  Therefore, the Prime Minister needed to have a ready 
campaign when the government would hold a referendum on the euro.  And, there was a 
very clear signal given to participants in BiE that the Prime Minister intended to have a 
referendum.
43
  Participants in Britain in Europe, therefore, agreed to delay heavy 
campaigning for the euro until after the general election that was due to take place in May 
2001.  At that time, the BiE group would be direly needed to allow the Prime Minister to 
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make the case for the euro, assess the five economic tests early in the honeymoon period 
of the government, and probably hold a referendum about 18 months later.
44
   
After the general election of 2001, participants in BiE became anxious.  Until then, 
businesses had been patient when told by the government that no serious move would be 
taken towards membership of EMU in the current Parliament.  However, after the general 
election, businesses started to seriously ask when the adoption of the euro was going to 
happen.
45
  BiE had fulfilled its agreement to delay heavy campaigning for the euro until 
after the general election when Chancellor Brown would assess his five economic tests.  
At that time, therefore, businesses began to put much more pressure on the government to 
take Britain into the euro.  Simon Buckby explained: 
 
After 2001, the position of the campaign was still what I reconfigured it to be, 
which was being pro European and support the euro when the conditions are 
right.  However, in practice, our approach became much more aggressive and we 
now started to press the government a lot more […] The business leaders and I 
were of the same view that we should join when the conditions are right but we 
now wanted to encourage the government to make the conditions right.
46
 
 
 
In Blair‟s second term, however, it became clear that his main priority shifted 
away from the issue of the euro.  Immediately after the election, Blair reshuffled his 
cabinet in a way that removed from critical positions the most pro-euro figures, 
whosupported Britain in Europe and criticized the government for its indecision.  Foreign 
Secretary Robin Cook was demoted to Leader of the House of Commons and the more 
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Euroskeptic Jack Straw was appointed to the post of Foreign Secretary in his place.
 47
  
Similarly, Steven Byers lost his post of Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and was 
reappointed as Secretary of Transport, effectively moving him out of “the single currency 
limelight.”48   
Businesses engaged in BiE started to seriously doubt the intentions of the 
government to fulfill its part of the agreement.  They now resorted to issuing threats to 
disinvest if the government continued to be undecided on the euro issue.  Chairman of 
Unilever Niall FitzGerald, for example, told the press: “Everything on which we have 
based judgment up to now has assumed that by 2002 – sometime in the second half of 
2002 – there will be a referendum which will probably be won.”49  FitzGerald added that 
a confirmation that “the ground rules have changed” might prompt Unilever and other big 
corporations to rethink whether the UK is the right place to locate its manufacturing 
facilities that employ thousands of Britons.
50
 
The threats to disinvest did not materialize when Gordon Brown finally gave his 
assessment of the five tests, in June 2003, and declared that only one of the tests had 
passed.  Whereas from 1998 to 2001, internationally oriented businesses had intensely 
lobbied the government to join the euro, by 2003, many had lost interest in the issue.  BiE 
had started experiencing great financial difficulty in raising enough money to reach its 
targeted budget, as donors had become scarcer.
51
  Public records of BiE‟s finances 
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revealed that in 2002, “the group‟s cash reserves collapsed by 98.8%.”52  Large donations 
from businesses became a thing of the past, as in 2002, only nine companies gave more 
than ₤ 5000 to the cause.53  Many of the large donors initially involved in the campaign 
stopped supporting BiE and went on to worry about other issues.
54
  The negative 
assessment of the five tests in June 2003, therefore, did not lead to a huge uproar in the 
export-oriented business community.  The real disillusioned actors were not heads of 
international corporations but the administrators of the campaign.  Director of BiE Simon 
Buckby resigned his position shortly after the assessment of the five tests.
 55
   Upon 
leaving, he declared that he had realized early in the second term of the Labour 
government that the army originally set up to fight for the euro was never going to take 
arms: “The first signs that we might never fight at all came in the early days of the second 
term. We had assumed that then was the moment, but we were publicly told to „cool it‟ 
until ministers were ready.  The problem was, they never were ready.” 56   After the 
departure of Buckby and the loss of business support, BiE moved its focus to 
campaigning on a different issue: the EU constitution.  The organization officially ceased 
to exist in August 2005 after the “no votes” on the EU Constitution in France and the 
Netherlands.
57
   
 
c. Multinational Corporations 
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 Foreign-owned multinational corporations had been the most vocal advocates of 
Britain‟s entry into the euro zone, lobbying the government directly and very publicly.  
MNCs had expressed their concern that if Britain did not adopt the euro, it would 
seriously hurt their competitiveness.  Ford, the largest employer in the automobile 
industry in Britain, had explained that being based in the UK and exporting to the euro 
zone was the equivalent for the company of paying a tax of 25 percent.  The 
government‟s response to multinational corporations‟ complaints was to reassure them 
that the UK would soon join the euro zone using a similar discourse as the one used with 
British businesses involved in BiE.  For example, in 1998, Tony Blair gave assurance to 
executives of Japan‟s Federation of Economic Organization that as far as the euro was 
concerned, Britain would “…definitely join early in the twenty first century.” 58   As 
MNCs continued to voice their fears, UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook traveled to 
Tokyo in September 1999 to reassure Japanese businesses that Britain did seriously 
intend to become part of the euro zone.
59
   
 The Labour government also responded to multinational corporations‟ complaints 
by heavily subsidizing those industries suffering the most from the UK remaining outside 
of the euro area.  Heavy subsidies to targeted companies were used to compensate for the 
loss they suffered from the exchange rate.  These subsidies effectively provided MNCs 
with incentives to continue to produce in the UK.  Nissan, which had threatened to move 
its production on the continent, received ₤97 million from the UK government in 2000, 
making the Japanese company the most heavily subsidized firm in Britain.
60
  The 
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Japanese MNC subsequently decided to build its new Micra in its Sunderland plant rather 
than in France.  The US multinational corporation Black & Decker was also offered a 
seven-figure package which prompted the company not to close its manufacturing plant 
located near Tony Blair‟s constituency. 61 
 Similarly, as British businesses involved in Britain in Europe, foreign-owned 
MNCs did not strongly react after the 2003 negative assessment of the five tests by 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown.  Japanese and other foreign-owned MNCs 
did not leave the UK as they had threatened to do so.  Even Nissan, which had warned the 
government it wanted, “clear and reassuring signs that Britain was moving towards euro 
membership” before committing to produce other new models in the UK, did not 
disinvest.
62
  In September 2004, after Gordon Brown made it clear there would be no 
referendum on the euro with his decision not to commission a new assessment of the five 
tests, Nissan announced the production of yet another model, the Tone, in its Sunderland 
plant.  In 2005, Nissan even publicly declared it did not want the British government to 
join the euro anymore.
63
  Today, Nissan reports that the UK is not in the euro zone has 
become irrelevant to the company.   
 
IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO BUSINESS LOBBYING 
 
Research findings show that during Tony Blair‟s second term, export-oriented 
businesses stopped agitating over the euro.  The preliminary negative assessment of the 
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five tests in 1997 and decision not to join the euro with the first wave of EU countries had 
led to mobilization and major threats to disinvest by large exporters to the euro zone.  
The 2003 assessment of the economic tests and similar decision not to join in the 
immediate future, however, left the internationally oriented business community much 
more indifferent.  It seems that businesses gave up on trying to influence the government 
to make a positive decision on the euro.  This passivity on the part of the business 
community most affected by Britain not taking part in the euro is surprising.  Although 
the initial positioning of businesses on the issue of the euro was exactly as Frieden‟s 
model predicted, it was not sustained over time.  How can we explain this ultimate lack 
of perseverance on trying to sway government economic policy from a significant sector 
of the business community that had initially voiced a clear preference?  
The government‟s response to the business lobby favoring the euro helps explain 
their loss of interest in continuing to push for the issue.  The main strategy of the 
government, when confronted with a strong business lobby in favor of the euro, was to 
calm their impatience to join by buying time.  This strategy can be seen in the way the 
government took control of the Britain in Europe campaign by momentarily changing its 
focus.  The same strategy can be observed with the granting of subsidies to corporations 
affected by the exchange rate in order to convince them to retain production in Britain. In 
other words, this tactic of buying time was made possible by a government policy on the 
euro that seemed to let all doors open while retaining complete control of the timing of a 
decision.  The Labour government made it clear at the outset that it would not rush its 
decision on the euro by making it determinant on the five economic tests to be assessed 
early in the next Parliament, i.e., in a second term.  By pushing the date for a decision on 
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the euro so far forward, the government could hope for two developments that would 
mitigate against lobbying pressure to join EMU: 1) businesses would have found ways 
around the currency problem; and 2) monetary policy changes could be implemented in 
the meantime to minimize the volatility of the sterling with the euro.    In fact, these two 
developments did occur and ultimately diminished the preference intensity for the euro of 
the internationally oriented business community.   
Large businesses with significant markets on the continent realized that life 
outside the euro zone could be managed.  For many firms, it was a matter of shifting the 
currency risk onto less powerful actors down the supply chain.  Nissan was one of the 
first multinationals to start working around the currency problem that threatened its 
competitiveness by shifting the burden of fluctuating exchange rate risks to its 
suppliers.
64
  Nissan required all its suppliers to invoice the company in euros.  As long as 
the invoices in euros do not exceed Nissan‟s euro revenues, the multinational company 
avoids currency fluctuation costs.  Many MNCs followed Nissan‟s “currency neutral 
production strategy” to remain competitive in European markets.    
Meanwhile, the Bank of England addressed the export-oriented producers‟ 
concern with volatility of the sterling against the euro by closely following the European 
Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy.  Recent empirical research by Plümper and 
Troeger demonstrates that countries outside of the euro zone, including the UK, tend to 
closely follow ECB policy in order to protect the competitiveness of their domestic 
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industries.
65
  Figure 1.1 indicates, for example, that the Bank of England closely follows 
changes in the interest rate of the ECB.   
 
 
Consequently, the UK today has almost a fixed exchange rate with the euro.  As 
Figure 1.2 below demonstrates, volatility between the sterling and the euro has greatly 
diminished.  From 1999 to 2003, volatility between the two currencies, as measured by 
the standard deviation, was seven percent whereas it fell to two percent from 2004-2007.  
Compared to other pairs of currencies, the euro-sterling exchange rate has been very 
stable in the last few years.   
The monetary policy of the Bank of England, therefore, was successful in 
diminishing the urge of British exporters to be part of the euro zone.  In effect, the height 
of the pro-euro business lobby took place during the time when sterling continued 
appreciating against the euro, and volatility between the pair of currencies was very high.  
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Internationally oriented businesses began to lose interest in the euro after sterling 
depreciated and the sterling-euro exchange rate subsequently stabilized.  The only outlier 
in this analysis is the CBI, which stopped campaigning for the euro when sterling was 
still appreciating and highly volatile against the euro.  This shows that the nature of trade 
associations, which are diversified in their interests and highly concerned with their 
public image in order to retain members, prevents them from acting as individual 
businesses do.  This fact demonstrates the limitation of relying on trade associations‟ 
positions to study business preferences regarding policy issues, which previous scholars 
have done.    To obtain a more accurate picture of business preferences, it is necessary to 
look beyond the official position of associations. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
This longitudinal study of the business position on euro membership over a 10-
year period in Britain sheds light on several disputed points regarding the preferences and 
influence of business on monetary policy.  First, research findings reveal that business 
actors are perfectly able to determine how a particular monetary regime will affect their 
interests.  This study, therefore, rejects McNamara‟s claim that businesses are unable to 
make this determination.  The empirical data show that business interests position 
themselves on major monetary policy decisions affecting the exchange rate – such as 
EMU membership – exactly as Frieden‟s model predicts.  Frieden‟s 1991 model is 
therefore a good predictive tool of how businesses initially position themselves on 
monetary policy. This case study, however, goes further than simply illustrating the 
initial position of business interests.  Specifically, additional insights have been provided 
as to how different business actors attempt to influence government policy and how the 
government responds to interest group pressure.  This study reveals that large 
international business interests do not necessarily receive exactly what they demand.  
Pro-euro British businesses did not pressure the government into a referendum on the 
euro, even though several studies showed it could have been won by presenting a strong 
economic case backed by business interests.
66
  Rather, the government was able to 
dampen their initial enthusiasm and demands for joining the euro with a strategy aimed at 
buying time.   
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Pro-euro businesses, however, did wield influence over the government, as it had 
to placate business by providing heavy subsidies and by eventually adopting a national 
monetary policy that minimizes exchange-rate volatility with the euro.  A significant 
research finding is, therefore, that although the internationally oriented business sector 
will prefer a fixed exchange rate system or joining a monetary union as Frieden predicts, 
it will be responsive to an alternative solution.  The Bank of England‟s monetary policy 
that reduced appreciation of sterling and volatility with the euro was ultimately 
satisfactory to the business sector with significant trade in the euro zone.  Today, in 
Britain, there is no more lobbying for joining the European single currency even from 
this business sector that was so adamant about becoming part of the euro zone early on.  
We can extrapolate that, should sterling appreciate against the euro and exchange rates 
between the two currencies become highly volatile again, the export-oriented business 
sector would start demanding that the British government seriously reconsider joining the 
euro.  However, it is likely that the Bank of England will continue to implement a 
monetary policy that minimizes volatility with the euro by closely following what the 
European Central Bank is doing.  This policy keeps all business coalitions satisfied as 
monetary policy autonomy is retained, which matters to import-competing producers of 
tradable goods and the non-tradable sector, while volatility is minimized, which pleases 
export-oriented producers of tradable goods and multinational corporations. 
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